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I. Introduction 
In Arkansas, there were few new developments in oil and gas law during 
the survey period of August 1, 2016 to July 31, 2017.  Two cases are 
highlighted below as part of this summary.  
II. Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
The Arkansas General Assembly met during the survey period; however, 
all matters concerning oil and gas dealt with funding the Arkansas Oil and 
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Gas Commission and were not substantive.  Despite the lack of substantive 
development, Arkansas notably transferred the Arkansas Energy Office to 
the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality.1 
III. Judicial Developments 
A. Verdict in Class Action Suit Concerning Royalty Payments 
Toward the end of the survey period a jury rendered a verdict in one of 
the many cases against Southwestern Energy Company and its subsidiaries 
alleging unpaid and/or underpaid royalties. 
The jury issued a verdict on June 16, 2017, in Smith v. SEECO, Inc., in 
favor of Southwestern.2  The original complaint alleged that Southwestern 
and its affiliates violated lease provisions by creating “a system in which 
they fraudulently sell their services to each other, setting up a system of 
self-dealing . . . ,” which skims money from the revenues the plaintiffs 
should have received.3  The jury found no evidence of a fraudulent 
scheme.4  The plaintiffs have appealed.  It is unclear how this decision will 
affect the number of class action suits pending against Southwestern in both 
federal and state courts.  
B. Language in Deed Shows Intent to Reserve Minerals  
The Arkansas Court of Appeals held that certain language in a 1974 
deed, along with the inactions of the grantee of said deed, were the 
determining factors in a quiet title action for mineral rights.5  
In this case, Mayne Hawkins and Matilda Hawkins conveyed to W. J. 
Cargile a tract of land containing 30 acres, reserving the oil and gas 
underlying the land.6  Cargile then conveyed his interest in the surface of 
the 30-acre tract back to Mayne Hawkins.7  In 1974, Mayne Hawkins and 
Matilda Hawkins executed a warranty deed to Jerry Duvall and Wanda 
Duvall conveying the same 30-acre tract with the following provision: “It 
being understood that all oil, gas, and other minerals in or under or that may 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Act 271, S.B. 256, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017). 
 2. Case No. 4:14-cv-00435-BSM, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Arkansas, Western Division. 
 3. Complaint at 6, Smith v. SEECO, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-00435-BRW (E.D. Ark. July 
25, 2014). 
 4. Verdict Form, Smith v. SEECO, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-00435-BSM (E.D. Ark. June 16, 
2017). 
 5. Duvall v. Carr-Pool, 509 S.W.3d 661, 666-67 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016). 
 6. Id. at 663. 
 7. Id. 
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be produced from said land have been previously reserved or conveyed.”8  
Subsequently, the Hawkins and/or their successors-in-interest executed oil 
and gas leases over the property in 1981, 1988, 1994, and 2005.9  Duvall 
knew of such leases but did not object to them.10  In August of 2012, XTO 
Energy Inc. suspended royalty payments to Vicki Elizabeth Carr-Pool, as 
Trustee of the TRV Irrevocable Trust, successor-in-interest to the Hawkins, 
and requested that she obtain a stipulation of interest from Duvall due to the 
questionable language in the 1974 deed.11  When contacted by Carr-Pool 
regarding the interest conveyed in the 1974 deed, Duvall objected.12  Carr-
Pool filed a petition to quiet title in the mineral rights and for a declaratory 
judgment that Duvall owned only the surface of the property.13  
The trial court granted declaratory judgment in favor of Carr-Pool, 
finding that because Carr-Pool and her predecessors in interest had entered 
into oil and gas leases for the mineral rights in 1981, 1988, 1994, and 2005 
without objection since the 1974 deed, Carr-Pool had acquired the mineral 
rights through adverse possession.14  Duvall appealed.15   
The appeals court affirmed the lower court’s order but on different 
grounds.16  The appeals court said that the case could not be affirmed on the 
adverse possession theory because it is a settled rule in Arkansas that title to 
minerals cannot be acquired by adverse possession unless the minerals are 
actually invaded by opening mines or drilling wells and continues for the 
necessary statutory period.17  In this case, there was no evidence presented 
that the leases were active mines or wells.18 
The court did, however, find that the original deed from Hawkins to 
Duval contained language sufficient to vest the mineral rights reservation in 
the Hawkins, the predecessors of Carr-Pool.19  The court focused on the 
following language in the deed: “It being understood that all oil, gas, and 
other minerals in or under or that may be produced from said land have 
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 9. Id. at 663-64. 
 10. Id. at 665. 
 11. Id. at 664-65. 
 12. Id. at 665. 
 13. Id. at 663. 
 14. Id. at 665-66.  
 15. Id. at 662-63. 
 16. Id. at 663. 
 17. Id. at 666-67 (internal citation omitted). 
 18. Id. 
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been previously reserved or conveyed.”20 The court found that, although 
there are no “magic words” required to reserve mineral rights, this language 
clearly evidences the grantor’s intentions to reserve the mineral rights.21 
The court also found as evidence of the parties’ intent the fact that Duvall 
did not think he owned the mineral rights and never questioned their 
ownership from the time of the deed until 2012 when Carr-Pool sought to 
quiet title to the mineral rights.22 Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed 
the trial court’s ruling.23  
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